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ABSTRACT
This study explores the relationship between the reader 
and the text as depicted in Jonathan Swift's third voyage in 
Gulliver's Travels. A Vovacre to Laputa.
If, according to Swift, satire is a reflective glass, 
and, A Vovaae to Laputa is a satire, then A Vovaae to Laputa 
is a reflective glass. Reading a satire, therefore, is 
similar to looking in a glass (or mirror), whereby the 
reader may "see" his reflection. Sight, then, is a metaphor 
for knowledge— when the reader "sees" himself reflected in 
the satire determines whether he is a fool.
Simply decoding the text forces the reader to 
participate in the satire, for he too may be mocked if he 
incorrectly deciphers Gulliver's words or expressions, if he 
erroneously "breaks" Swift's "literary codes."
But, if the reader must "break" those codes to 
understand the text, and, he must "see" his reflection in 
Swift's satiric glass, then a certain kind of foolishness is 
required— namely, an admission that one is a fool. Ultimate 
wisdom, therefore, comes from being a reader who "sees" 
himself "face to face" as in a reflective glass.
This reading process is ridiculed in A Vovaae to 
Laputa. To understand the text, the reader must perform the 
very tasks Swift mocks. When the reader chooses to "break" 
a code, when he unscrambles anagrams, when he discovers who 
"speaks as a fool," he risks being a hypocrite who cannot 
"see" his decoding errors or a fool who can.
Yet, sometimes, the reader may successfully decode a 
word or expression without being a hypocrite or a fool, an 
achievement which encourages his intellectual vanity, and 
thus, may lead him to commit decoding errors. Hence, the 
reader may confront his reflection numerous times during the 
course of his reading experience, a tug-of-war between 
foolishness and wisdom.
Decoding A Voyage to Laputa. then, challenges not the 
reader's intellectual capabilities, but his ability to see 
his intellectual limitations.
THE READER'S REFLECTION IN SWIFT'S 
A VOYAGE TO LAPUTA
I. Looking through Swift's glass
Lewis Grumbles a little at fGul1iver1s Trave1s1 & 
says he wants the Key to it . . .  . Gulliver is 
in every body's Hands Lord Scarborow who is no 
inventor of Storys told me that he fell in company 
with a Master of a ship, who told him that he was 
very well acguainted with Gulliver, but that the 
printer had Mistaken, that he lived in Wapping, & 
not in Rotherhith. I lent the Book to an old 
Gentleman, who went immediately to his Map to 
search for Lilly Putt (John Arbuthnot to Swift, 
November 5, 1726).
Readers have often behaved like the foolish man racing to 
his map since the first publication of Gulliver's Travels. 
Abounding in political allusions and teasing word games, 
Swift's voyages entice readers, promising some answers while 
withholding others. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
Gulliver's third adventure, A Voyage to Laputa, the least 
understood and the least liked of the four voyages.
How one reads a satire like A Voyage to Laputa is a 
difficult question. "Satire," Swift wrote, "is a sort of 
glass wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's 
face but their own, which is the chief reason for that kind 
of reception it meets in the world, and that so very few are 
offended with it."1 If A Voyage to Laputa is such a glass, 
anyone searching for a non-existent, flying island on a map 
is a fool who cannot see his own reflection.2 Simply 
deciphering the text, therefore, forces the reader to 
participate in the satire. Lured to unscramble the 
anagrams, to find the puns, to provide a "key" for
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interpretation, to discover an imaginary island on a map, 
the reader often seems foolish. Yet, this foolishness is 
also necessary to Swift's satire, because the underlying 
political allusions must also be decoded. I believe that in 
A Voyage to Laputa, when the reader sees himself reflected 
in the satire determines whether the reader is a fool.
If the reader must decide when it is appropriate to 
decode the text, and, his judgment is influenced by a 
capricious narrator, when the reader sees through him 
determines whether the reader decodes foolishly. Because 
decoding is an act of reading "perceptively," and because 
Swift is an author who demands a particular interchange 
between the reader and the text, I believe that decoding is 
a tug-of-war between foolishness and wisdom; and I shall 
argue that in order to decode the text wisely, the reader 
must recognize that in reading the text, the act of decoding 
is necessary on one page, demeaning on the next. Since 
Gulliver is a narrator whose speech and antics often trick 
us into decoding incorrectly, I believe that the reader's 
self-reflection, however revealing, is necessary to a fuller 
understanding of a text like A Voyage to Laputa, Swift's 
satire on intellectual folly.
II. The reader's reflection
When Swift compared satire to a reflective glass he 
alluded to a type of reading process where the author
4
invites the reader to observe himself during the course of 
his literary analysis, known today as "reader response" 
criticism.3 First, the detective-like reader decodes the 
text created by the author— or what Paul J. Korshin calls, 
the author's "literary codes" ("Deciphering Swift's Codes"). 
By "literary codes" I mean a word or expression in the text 
used ambiguously so that other meanings are implied.4 When 
the reader deciphers such codes, he actually replaces the 
initial word or expression with one which, in most cases, 
seems to resolve the ambivalence. Metaphors are 
conceptually similar codes, a view which Korshin advances, 
"[i]n its simplest sense, a metaphor, whereby a speaker or 
writer substitutes one or perhaps several words for a single 
verbal unit, is a literary code" (124). Reading, then, is 
similar to an investigative process whereby we "break" the 
author*s literary codes by resolving the ambiguity they 
present by substituting a series of plausible meanings which 
we make at our own discretion.
Thus, deciphering a literary code involves more than 
exchanging the author's word or expression— it involves our 
individual dispositions as well. Wolfgang Iser defines such 
self-analysis as the reader's active participation in 
bringing out meaning through self-confrontations with his 
abilities to comprehend the text (The Implied Reader. 31). 
Similarly, Swift holds up his satiric glass for the reader's 
perusal, whereby the reader may scrutinize himself. If
5
"breaking11 Swift's codes wisely means we sometimes see 
ourselves reflected in the satire, then reading wisely 
produces a series of self-confrontations, a process of 
learning during which our own sense of discernment may fall 
under investigation.
This intersection of text and reader is what brings the 
literary work into existence, a point of convergence that 
Iser claims must remain indefinite, or "virtual":
It is the virtuality of the work that gives rise 
to its dynamic nature, and this in turn is the 
precondition for the effects that the work calls 
forth. As the reader uses the various 
perspectives offered him by the text in order to 
relate the patterns and "schematised views” to one 
another, he sets the work in motion, and this very 
process results ultimately in the awakening of 
responses within himself (275).5
So the reader's reflection upon his substitutions continues 
a reading process out of which emerges the actual content of 
the text.6 And, if such responses are part of the text, 
then Swift's summons to observe ourselves in his satiric 
glass fosters a method of reading which may ridicule our 
responses.
Swift's readers are ridiculed during this process 
precisely because distinguishing between Swift's sincere 
hints and red herrings is often difficult.7 Gulliver's 
Travels contains a variety of serious and superficial codes 
that stimulate the reader's participation because of their 
duplicitous nature.8 Thus the reader, not always knowing
when it is appropriate to substitute a word or expression 
for what appears cryptic in the text, often miscalculates. 
These errors in judgment are compounded by an author who 
willfully manipulates the reader into these failures, for 
Swift*s satire achieves its greatest end when the reader 
recognizes his mistakes. Because Gulliver*s Travels invites 
our self-reflections, we must remember that, if we accept 
this invitation, we may be the satire’s target.
The reader who fails to make this distinction is 
himself satirized. If Swift's satires can be compared to a 
reflective glass, then those readers who discover everybody 
else's face reflected in the satire except their own are 
foolish, because they cannot see their own reflection; yet, 
those readers who discover their faces reflected in the 
satire are also foolish, because they admit that they see 
their own reflection. The reader must decide which type of 
fool he is: if the reader does not see his own reflection
in the satire, he denies being the object of Swift's 
ridicule, thus making him ridiculous; and if the reader does 
see his reflection, he admits that he is ridiculous.
This rhetorical contradiction is an example of what 
Frederik N. Smith calls the dangerous Swiftian "double 
binds" found in Gulliver's Travels ("The Danger of Reading 
Swift: The Double Binds of Gulliver's Travels"). Such
"entrapments" are Swift's "demonstration to the reader that 
his usual procedures of understanding are debilitatingly
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naive, simplistic, complacent, inconsistent, or inadequate 
in some other way" (Smith, 110). Smith further explains how 
such a trap is set:
1) two or more persons, one of whom is the 
"victim"; 2) a primary injunction to do or not to 
do such a thing, which is coupled with a 
threatened punishment for an infraction; 3) a 
secondary injunction that conflicts with the first 
on a more abstract level, is often implicit, and 
is likewise coupled with threatened punishment; 4) 
repeated experience, to the point that the victim 
comes to expect mixed messages (120).
Swift*s reflective glass is such a trap, for he displays his 
satire for our examination and says "Look!" Because we are 
inconsistently rewarded and punished for "breaking" Swift*s 
codes— even when he instructs us to do so— we alternate 
between obedience and disobedience when we decipher these 
metaphors.
If reading is a continuous tug-of-war between two 
conflicting injunctions, then Gulliver*s Travels possesses 
two audiences— those who look into satire*s glass and those 
who do not. Smith also discusses this kind of readership in 
Gulliver*s Travels, defining one as the characterized reader 
that Gulliver addresses, and the second as the implied 
reader that Swift addresses.9 The characterized reader is 
much like Gulliver: he is British, he is familiar with
travel literature and its conventions, he is easily shocked 
by the profane, he is easily impressed by the supercilious, 
and his naivety, arrogance, and shallowness often make him
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the object of Swift's ridicule. He is Gulliver's "Gentle 
Reader," a man who automatically sympathizes with Gulliver's 
point of view, especially when Gulliver solicits his 
opinion.
The implied reader, however, is Swift's audience: he
can decode clues faster than the characterized reader, he is 
wise to the ways of the world, he knows he can be satire's 
victim as often as the characterized reader, and he can 
admit it, which ultimately brings him to a greater 
understanding of what has happened in the text (Smith, 119). 
Iser further defines this type of reader:
If the fulfillment of the novel demands a 
heightened faculty of judgment, it is only natural 
that the narrator should also compel the reader—  
at times quite openly— to reflect on his own 
situation, for without doing so he will be 
incapable of judging the actions of the characters 
in the novel" (114) .
The implied reader, then, questions his ability to render 
sense out of the text, for he is aware of his potentially 
hypocritical stance. Hence, readers are similar to the 
characters within the text, readers who are given certain 
traits they may accept or reject, in the same way they may 
see their reflection in Swift's glass or not.
Character-like, these performances are sometimes worthy 
of censure and sometimes praiseworthy. The characterized 
reader is encouraged to distance himself from the other 
characters, to judge and decipher the text from a
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supercilious position, thus avoiding any personal 
involvement, or reflection upon such an attitude:
In order to develop this awareness, the narrator 
creates situations in which the characters1 
actions correspond to what the reader is tricked 
into regarding as natural, subsequently feeling 
the irresistible urge to detach himself from the 
proceedings. And if the reader ignores the 
discreet summons to observe himself, then his 
critical attitude toward the characters becomes 
unintentionally hypocritical, for he forgets to 
include himself in the judgement (Iser, 116).
Disregarding Swift1s admonitions to see himself reflected in 
the satire, the characterized reader becomes hypocritical, 
for he neglects to evaluate his own responses. Conversely, 
the implied reader reflects upon his performance in the same 
manner in which he evaluates the other characters, thus 
granting him a greater understanding of the text and his 
position in it:
Instead of just seeing through them [the 
characters], he [the implied reader] sees himself 
reflected in them, so that the superior position 
which the narrator [i.e., Gulliver] has given him 
over the pretenses and illusions of the characters 
now begins to fade. [This] reader realizes that 
he is similar to those who are supposed to be the 
objects of criticism, and so the self- 
confrontations that permeate the novel compel him 
to become aware of his own position in evaluating 
that of the characters (Iser, 116).
Swift's solicitation reminds the implied reader of his 
deficiencies in understanding by revealing his resemblance 
to the cast. Whether we are such readers depends on our
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willingness to see ourselves in the text as a character, or 
we risk being "two-faced."
Because having "two faces" implies two reflections, the 
reader may see alternate images of himself in Swift's 
reflective glass. Depending on when we chose to see, or 
rather, to evaluate the wisdom of our decoding decisions—  
our substitutions— we are either the characterized reader or 
the implied reader, a tug-of-war between roles throughout 
the course of our reading experience. Swift creates this 
duality when he asks us to react in one of two ways: to see
ourselves in the glass of satire or not. Reading, 
therefore, is a process of self-confrontations with our 
procedures of judgment— our ability to see ourselves 
reflected in the decisions we make.
Sight, then, is a metaphor for knowledge: to see
oneself revealed in satire's glass is to be a wise reader. 
Similarly, if asserting wisdom is foolish, and confessing 
folly is wise, then ultimate wisdom means becoming a reader 
who sees his own reflection in the satire, or rather, who 
recognizes his decoding errors. If our "vision" is 
sometimes obscured by the ambiguity a word or expression 
presents, and our decoding decisions are influenced by the 
narrator, then deciding whether Gulliver is trustworthy 
determines when we decode those words or expressions. If we 
do not trust Gulliver, we will search for the metaphor 
lurking behind his words— if we trust him, we will accept
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his words at "face value." What constitutes truth, then, 
must be determined if we are to decode Swift's glass of 
satire.
II. Looking through Paul's glass
In defining satire as a glass that reveals such truths, 
Swift alludes to I Corinthians 13:12: "For now we see
through a glass, darkly, but then face to face: now I know
in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known"
(Holy Bible, King James Version of 1611, 855).10 The 
correlation hinges on the word "glass." The Greek word 
"esoptron," here translated as "glass," "refers to the 
common bronze mirror of antiquity, the surface of which, 
even when freshly polished, produced a dim and distorted 
image . . ." (Holy Bible, 855).11 In the Pauline text,
once again sight is a metaphor for knowledge: "Now I see
incompletely, then I shall know fully." Ultimate wisdom— or 
rather, truth— for both Paul and Swift, then, comes from 
communicating "face to face," as in a reflective mirror.12
If Paul's and Swift's mirrors/glasses reveal truth, 
then how truth is revealed is an important question. Since 
what we see depends upon our perception and upon what has 
been made available, then what we know depends upon a 
combination of our innate abilities and what is disclosed. 
Like an oracle, a glass reveals images or answers; but since 
man "sees through a glass darkly," such images or answers 
are obscure. Delphi answered Oedipus, but Oedipus did not 
understand what Delphi said; so, according to his 
intellectual abilities, Oedipus interpreted, or decoded, 
that answer.13 Because man understands incompletely, he
12
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is forced, like Oedipus, to decode revealed answers based on 
his natural abilities. If interpretation is subject to 
perception, truth is ambiguous; similarly, if the reader's 
perceptions determine what he sees in the satire, answers 
appear ambiguous. So, the author reveals answers to his 
readers' queries through his glass— or rather, his satire—  
but whether readers perceive them, or rather, how they 
decode them, depends on their intellectual abilities.
Decoding a satire wisely, therefore, depends on both 
the author's willingness to provide answers and the reader's 
ability to decode them. Such an interpretative process is 
similar to the concept of revelation in Christian theology, 
where revelation is a combination of what is disclosed by 
God and our natural abilities; or rather, a combination of 
revealed and natural theology.14 That Swift deliberately 
withheld some answers and provided others is evident from 
both his correspondence regarding Gulliver1s Travels and the 
secretive manner in which he first published it. Both bits 
of evidence point to the conclusion that a select few were 
"in on the joke" while the rabble was ignored.15 Irvin 
Ehrenpreis' biography on Swift is persuasive about this:
Swift's allusive but secretive style of dealing 
with the progress of his masterpiece rGulliver's 
Travels1 suggests what one would assume from 
reading it with attention— i.e., that he wished it 
to surprise his readers and yet wanted a chosen 
few to be prepared for the hoaxes and ironies . .
. . Swift wished to hide what he was doing from
the profane while revealing it to the initiate . .
. . It would have been pointless to produce a
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book that no one understood. He relied on a core 
of enlightened readers to pick up clues . . .  a 
chosen few who might join him in laughing at the 
rest. The friends whom he entrusted with his 
secret stood for that select audience. They would 
know without being told that the author was only 
clowning . . . (Ill, 447).
Ultimate knowledge depends upon an act of grace on the 
author's part, where the reader's natural abilities are 
augmented by what is revealed by the god-like author. 
Unfortunately, although today's reader may have a more 
comprehensive view of the eighteenth century, he is less 
able to decipher Swift's satire itself because it contains 
unfamiliar political allusions and word games; therefore, we 
are more apt to read foolishly.
In order to decode a satire, however, a certain type of 
foolishness is required— namely, an admission that one is a 
fool. St. Paul argues for this type of folly in I 
Corinthians (according to Ehrenpreis, Swift's favorite 
Pauline epistle was I Corinthians) when he claims that 
ultimate salvation comes from being a Fool in Christ.16 
To be such a fool in Christ found its fullest expression in 
an early sixteenth century work by one of Swift's favorite 
authors, Desiderius Erasmus' Moriae encomium or The Praise 
of Follv.17 In it, Stultitia (Folly) praises the role she 
plays in human life, which is to grant man the formula for 
true happiness, "ignorance is bliss." Certainly Swift 
expounds this philosophy in his "Digression Concerning 
Madness" (another type of folly) in A Tale of A Tub; "This
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[ignorance] is the sublime and refined Point of Felicity, 
called, the Possession of being well deceived; the Serene 
Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves" (Writings,
352). Furthermore, Stultitia argues, if to be a man is to 
be a fool, Christ's incarnation made him the greatest of all 
fools.18 Hence, if man is to imitate Christ, then in 
order to achieve ultimate wisdom, he too must become foolish 
in order to be wise. For Paul, if ultimate salvation comes 
from being a fool who clearly sees his own image in a 
mirror, then such foolishness is desirable. Similarly, for 
Swift, ultimate wisdom comes from being a reader who sees 
himself in the satire, or "face to face." Reading, then, is 
a series of self-confrontations with our own reflection, our 
own standards of criticism, our own mistakes.
These errors are compounded by a narrator who often 
looks like a fool, yet, upon reflection, speaks wisely. The 
oxymoronic idea that the fool may possess wisdom evolved 
from the centuries-old custom of employing physically 
deformed or mentally retarded people for the purpose of 
household entertainment.19 These unaffected fools speak 
without offense because the witless cannot be regulated by 
society— they are outside of society's rules because rules 
apply only to those responsible for their actions. When 
Paul says, "I speak as a fool" (II Corinthians 11),
Stultitia echoes it: "it's the special privilege of fools
to speak the truth without giving offense" (78). Their very
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idiocy protects them from society's censure. Consequently, 
those who assume such an "idiotic" defense to disguise their 
wisdom escape the criticism wise men suffer. If Gulliver, 
like Paul, sometimes "speaks as a fool," then such speech 
explains why Swift's satire offends so few— the sting of 
truth is dulled by the appearance of folly.
The distinction between what William Willeford in his 
The Fool and His Scepter calls these "natural" fools and 
"artificial" fools was made during the reign of Elizabeth I, 
when knaves performed like "natural" fools (10). The 
literary value of such characters who speak and act freely 
was recognized by such authors as William Shakespeare (As 
You Like It), Ben Jonson (The Alchemist), and Alexander Pope 
(The Dunciad), whose works often contained professionally 
amusing fools who were far from witless. The "all-licensed 
fool" (so-called in Shakespeare's King Lear by Lear's 
enraged daughter, Goneril) is the perfect mouthpiece for the 
author, for such leniency allows "artificial" fools the 
opportunity to be aggressive in their denunciations, 
vindictive in their attitude, and most of all, wise in their 
condemnation of folly. One thinks of the fool in 
Shakespeare's King Lear, whose special status in society 
allowed him to expose truths that Kent was banished for 
revealing. Such an "artificial" fool can mask the author's 
voice— the author can now speak and act with the fool's 
impunity, without fear of censure or retaliation.20
Using this literary artifice— the "wise" fool— is 
another example of Swift's rhetorical contradictions, or 
entrapments. Initially, we dismiss what the babbling fool 
says, for such drivel is usually offensive and senseless—  
both of which encourage our dissociation from the text, 
whereby we become characterized readers. Upon reflection, 
however, such hasty assessments may transform us into what 
we condemned (i.e., fools), because we first ignored the 
possibility of wisdom lurking behind the prattle— such 
contemplation, then, would make us implied readers. At the 
same time, it may be foolish to meditate upon such asinine 
speech— if so, then the characterized reader's dismissal 
would be wise, and the implied reader's meditation foolish. 
These ironic reversals of our expectations undermine our 
attempts to "break" Swift's codes, for such entrapments 
sabotage our confidence in our normal procedures of 
understanding, of ascertaining truth.
But decoding a satire astutely requires the reader to 
unmask truth. Unfortunately, because Gulliver may be 
justified not by truth but by the pretension to truth, the 
reader's attempts to distinguish between honest hints and 
surreptitious hoaxes, to discriminate between sincerity and 
duplicity, are often thwarted.21 Discovering when fools 
affect wisdom and wise men affect folly, then, signifies 
when it is appropriate to decode their words.22 Yet, 
because Gulliver's speech and antics seem normal in A Voyage
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to Laputa, we are inclined to identify with this narrator 
and trust his judgments, rather than decode his words. If 
this satire ridicules our decoding efforts by demonstrating 
that our usual procedures of understanding are naive and 
deficient, then I believe that Swift intended the 
nondescript narrator of A Voyage to Laputa to lure us into a 
sense of complacency regarding our own intellectual 
abilities, which makes us this satire's victim.
III. Gulliver's reflection
When Gulliver narrates his adventures in Laputa, he 
neither looks nor behaves like the fool he appears to be in 
the other three voyages, so deciding when he "speaks as a 
fool" is difficult. Because Gulliver appears like an 
ordinary, modest Englishman in Laputa, we accept his 
assessments at "face value" without bothering to search for 
a duplicitous metaphor lurking behind his words. Depending 
on when we choose to "see" or rather, to evaluate, the 
wisdom of trusting such a conventional narrator— we are 
either the characterized reader or the implied reader, whose 
roles are in a tug-of-war throughout the course of our 
reading experience. Without the physical resemblance to 
what readers might recognize as a "natural" or "artificial" 
fool, we may be duped into regarding Gulliver as a harmless, 
honest narrator. Because such overt clues are lacking in A 
Voyage to Laputa, determining when we should "break" Swift's 
literary codes depends on whether Gulliver successfully 
appeals to our intellectual vanity.
Gulliver is more appealing— and therefore, more 
credible— in this voyage precisely because he lacks the 
visual abnormalities between himself and the different 
societies he encounters there, which, in the other three 
voyages, make him look foolish. In the other voyages— the 
journeys to Lilliput, Brobdingnag, and Houyhnhnms— Gulliver 
betrays characteristics that belie the truth he advocates.
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Although his physical appearance may seem normal to the 
reader who identifies with Gulliver as the narrator and as 
an Englishman, when compared to the Lilliputians, the 
Brobdingnagians, and the Houyhnhnms, Gulliver appears 
grossly deformed. In Lilliput, he is a giant towering above 
people to whom he fawns. In Brobdingnag, he is a midget 
among giants— smaller even than the Queen1s fool, her dwarf, 
whose animus Gulliver incurs when Gulliver teases him about 
his height (85-6)— and becomes the plaything of dogs (93), 
monkeys (97-9), and immodest maids of honor (96). In the 
land of the Houyhnhnms, he is a savage among a society of 
cultivated animals (202-3). These physical differences 
parallel the overall thematic design in Gulliver's Travels, 
namely, that our conceptions about our faculties are grossly 
exaggerated. Because Gulliver's adventure in Laputa lacks 
these overt clues, we often assume that Gulliver's 
faculties, like ours, are intact. In Laputa, Gulliver is 
more likely to convince us of his sincerity, and thus, we 
will take his words at "face value," neglecting to decipher 
them.
This identification is also encouraged by the 
Laputians1 treatment of Gulliver. He walks unmolested 
through their streets and is considered an honored visitor, 
rather than a slave or beast whose intelligence is 
debatable, a theme that is only lightly touched upon in 
Laputa. While residing in Lilliput, he is first
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incarcerated in a cathedral; in Brobdingnag he is placed in 
a box; in the land of the Houyhnhnms he is housed in a 
stable like their servants. In Laputa, however, Gulliver is 
a free man, traveling to several different countries and 
encountering several different races of men within the third 
book. Because Gulliver is considered an equal in Laputa, we 
are therefore more likely to take him seriously, and less 
likely to "see" a literary code lurking in his words.
Because Gulliver also behaves decorously in Laputa, we 
presume he is not as licentious as he appears in Lilliput, 
Brobdingnag, and the land of the Houyhnhnms. These 
societies disapprove of his behavior, citing such reasons as 
publicly urinating (Lilliput), possessing barbarous ideas 
(Brobdingnag), and lying (Houyhnhnms). He is accused in 
Lilliput of seditious actions: "in open Breach of the said
Law, under Colour of extinguishing the Fire kindled in the 
Apartment of his Majesty1s most dear Imperial Consort, did 
maliciously, traitorously, and devilishly, by discharge of 
his Urine, put out the said Fire kindled in the said 
Apartment . . . "  (48). He is vilified in Brobdingnag: "how
so impotent and groveling an Insect as [Gulliver] . . .
could entertain such inhuman Ideas [as advocating murder]" 
(109-10). He speaks falsely to the Houyhnhnms, or "says the 
Thing which is not" (214). Though inflating and deflating 
Gulliver's »'stature" is amusing, his conduct in these 
societies is reprehensible even to the reader who identifies
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with him; and, being such, should make the reader pause 
before he identifies with such foolish behavior. In Laputa, 
however, because Gulliver behaves properly, he seems a more 
trustworthy narrator during this voyage.
Furthermore, Gulliver's sincerity is suspicious in the 
other voyages because his characteristics and antics are 
also reminiscent of the "all-licensed fool," who is 
frequently portrayed with exaggerated body parts, i.e., with 
an extended phallus (as in Lilliput); depicted as a dwarf or 
midget, or with some such physical deformity (as in 
Brobdingnag); and, is associated with the bestial and 
lascivious (as compared with the Houyhnhnms).23 Such 
distortions produce elements of what is termed "the 
grotesque"— components of "the ridiculous, bizarre, 
extravagant, freakish and unnatural— in short, aberrations 
from the desirable norms of harmony, balance and 
proportion."24 Because Gulliver is a foreigner among 
societies of midgets, giants, and animals, then according to 
these societies, he is the deviant, the abnormality— the 
fool (whether Gulliver is a "natural" or "artificial" fool, 
however, depends on the situation). Such clues aid the 
reader's decoding facilities, for it places Gulliver in a 
literary legacy of wise fools— the "wise folly" tradition of 
Paul and Erasmus, Shakespeare and Jonson— a history of 
freaks, their shenanigans, and their perceptions. But, 
Laputa lacks the outward manifestation of this literary
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stratagem, so determining when Gulliver "speaks as a fool" 
in this voyage is more difficult.
Such a plain appearance is what makes Gulliver a more 
insidious narrator; for he is not the target of derision 
that he is in the other three adventures, does not commit 
gross errors in action or judgment, neither displays his 
penis nor discusses his own excrement, and is physically 
indistinguishable from the people he meets. Determining 
when Gulliver speaks foolishly in A Voyage to Laputa, then, 
is difficult because we identify best with those who 
resemble us; so, we are more likely to become characterized 
readers whose sagacity Gulliver, a conventional Englishman, 
beseeches. Thus, we are more apt to be deceived because we 
have been lulled into a sense of security with this 
narrator.
Because Gulliver appears unremarkable and behaves 
properly when we compare A Voyage to Laputa with the other 
voyages, critics of Gulliver's Travels have found A Voyage 
to Laputa so boring, so completely lacking in the 
originality the other voyages share, that most chalk up its 
deviations to Swift's eccentricities.25 Without the 
obvious physical differences pointing to the overall 
thematic design, the satire in A Voyage to Laputa is less 
obvious, and therefore, seems less stimulating.26
I believe, however, that such dullness encourages our 
decoding errors— we are seduced by this satire's monotony
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and deceived by Gulliver’s humdrum appearance. Here, 
Gulliver's banality is conspicuous. Since we must decide 
when it is appropriate to decode this satire, and our 
judgment is influenced by such a credible narrator, seeing 
ourselves reflected in Swift's glass of Laputa is harder, 
for we must resist identifying with Gulliver simply because 
he is made in our image. This being so, then Swift's more 
subtle entrapments in A Voyage to Laputa make our "fall from 
grace" a greater plunge, because such an unpretentious text 
and narrator give us more confidence in our normal 
procedures of understanding. I believe that Swift, 
determined to prove "the falsity of the Definition animale 
rationale; and to show it should be only rationis capax," 
satirizes our faith in our intellectual abilities by 
compelling us to misapply it.27
Ironically, Swift's portrayal of the narrator,
Gulliver, parallels the reader's situation, because Gulliver 
also decodes his own experience both wisely and foolishly. 
Depending on the situation, Gulliver is either condemning 
foolishness or being the foolish victim of Swift's 
ridicule.28 In the first instance, he is the wily voyager 
who can avoid "trampling on a Crucifix" (A Voyage to Laputa, 
187). And, he can adequately identify what he calls a "very 
common Infirmity of human Nature . . . [which] inclin[es] us 
to be more curious and conceited in Matters where we have 
least Concern, and for which we are least adapted either by
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Study or Nature" (A Voyage to Laputa, 137). In the second 
instance, Gulliver is the dupe, the simpleton, whose 
bumbling attempt at ingenuity fails to convince those 
readers who see through him:
The Word, which I interpret the Flying or Floating 
Island, is in the original Laputa; whereof I could 
never learn the true Etymology. Lap in the old 
obsolete Language signifieth High, and Untuh a 
Governor; from which they say by Corruption was 
derived Laputa from Lapuntuh. But I do not 
approve of this Derivation, which seems to be a 
little strained. I ventured to offer to the 
Learned among them a Conjecture of my own, that 
Laputa was quasi Lap outed; Lap signifying a Wing, 
which however I shall not obtrude, but submit to 
the judicious Reader" (A Voyage to Laputa, 135).
Because "Laputa" actually means "the whore" in Spanish, to 
supply the appropriate substitution for the word one must 
know Spanish; but, Gulliver*s faculties, despite proceeding 
in a rational manner, decode the word because they lack a 
key piece of the code, i.e., knowledge of Spanish. Gulliver 
has committed an act of folly: despite his obfuscating
modesty (which may be a pretense), he has betrayed himself 
as a pompous ass affecting wisdom, especially to those 
readers who know Spanish and see the metaphor. Gulliver's 
meanderings among alternate decodings should alert even the 
reader who does not know Spanish that Gulliver's decoding is 
suspect. For the reader who must determine when Gulliver is 
foolish and when not, his erratic behavior makes it 
difficult; and his affectation of reason confuses the 
foolish with the wise.
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Swift further complicates our decoding of Gulliver by 
frequently presenting him in a favorable light. Gulliver 
seems a humble surgeon, who, according to himself, merely 
reports the facts.29 As an impartial observer, Gulliver 
appears innocent, and consequently, seems not to be blamable 
for any particular reflections upon society or men. At the 
end of his travels, Gulliver claims, "I meddle not the least 
with any Party, but write without Passion, Prejudice, or 
Ill-will against any Man or Number of Men whatsoever" (257). 
He asserts that no objections can be made because no one 
else has ever travelled to these lands: "I am not a little
pleased that this Work of mine can possibly meet with no 
Censurers: For what Objections can be made against a Writer
who relates only plain Facts that happened in such distant 
Countries, where we have not the least Interest with respect 
either to Trade or Negotiations? (257)" He claims he writes 
virtuously, "for the noblest End, to inform and instruct 
Mankind, over whom I may, without Breach of Modesty, pretend 
to some Superiority, from the advantages received by 
conversing so long with the Houyhnhnms" (257). He writes 
without expecting earthly reward: "I write without any View
towards Profit or Praise" (257). And, Gulliver attests to 
the purity of his observations: "I never suffer a Word to
pass that may look like Reflection or possibly give the 
least Offence even to those who are most ready to take it.
So that, I hope, I may with Justice pronounce myself an
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Author perfectly blameless; against whom the Tribes of 
Answerers, Considerers, Observers, Reflectors, Detectors, 
Remarkers, will never be able to find Matter for exercising 
their Talents" (257; emphasis mine). Such a defense makes 
Gulliverfs integrity appear impregnable.
These protestations, however, are questionable because 
of Gulliver's apparent hostility. First, Swift creates a 
situation in which Gulliver's actions correspond to what the 
reader is tricked into regarding as a natural defense 
against hordes of critics. Next, Gulliver tells us his 
words do not reflect upon anyone; therefore, he is blameless 
of any wrongdoing. Finally— here is where Swift springs his 
trap— Gulliver's name-calling contradicts his original 
assertions, for decoding this passage means that the 
judicious reader becomes what Gulliver denounces, namely an 
"Answerer, Considerer, Observer, Reflector, Detector, and 
Remarker." And, Gulliver becomes a hypocrite, for he does 
offend and he does pass judgment . . .  on the reader who 
decodes his words. By encouraging readers to distance 
themselves from the objects of his attack, however, those 
who identify with Gulliver— i.e., characterized readers 
approving of Gulliver's assessments— fail to see his and 
their hypocrisy, which in turn, ridicules them.
Swift confirms the success of such a defense in a 
heavily sarcastic letter to L'Abbe des Fountaines, July 
1727. Reproaching Des Fountaines, an editor whose French
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translation of Gulliver's Travels callously deleted passages 
unfavorable to France and whose preface recorded offenses 
the original book had committed, Swift assures him that his 
portrayal of Gulliver has aroused no suspicions, because no 
one takes his observations on the "imperfections, the 
follies, and the vices of man" personally (The 
Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, III. 226).30 Such a 
presentation protects Swift from those who would accuse him 
of guile. But, under Gulliver's veneer of simplicity and 
artlessness lurks a crafty author out to trap the reader.
Swift further supports the credibility of the flying 
island with elaborate maps, street names, town names, etc. .
. , which establish a visual image and lend a sense of 
geographical reality to the text.31 Although distortion 
is characteristic of satire, these fabrications are given 
with Gulliver's solemn guarantee that because he is only a 
reporter of things that are, what he says must be true.
Such protestations maintain the facade necessary to satire, 
where fantasy challenges reality, where imagination 
challenges science, where folly challenges wisdom.
Readers are further duped because Gulliver's 
straightforward descriptions of preposterous objects, such 
as a flying island, seem to sustain his credibility; for, 
ingeniously, Gulliver's descriptions are actually based on 
eighteenth-century science. In a two-article series on the 
scientific background of A Voyage to Laputa, Marjorie
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Nicolson and Nora Mohler establish that, for his flying 
island, Swift used scientific sources that may account for 
the peculiar objects and experiments that abound in the 
satire, particularly those in the Laputian "Royal Academy of 
Lagado."32 Certainly the mechanisms by which Swift's 
floating island "flew" were recognizable to his audience, as 
Nicolson and Mohler pointed out, through the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society on London, particularly 
the few papers of John Strachey on strata in coal-mines and 
Gilbert's De Macrnete.33 Nicolson's and Mohler's articles 
were the first that coherently explained where Swift's 
satire in A Voyage to Laputa was directed, and also showed 
that Swift's satire was meant to perplex his readers in the 
same way a puzzle intrigues those who attempt to decode it:
Swift himself expressed the hope that posterity 
would be curious enough "to consult annuals and 
compare dates" in order to detect the double 
meanings in his work; he might have gone further 
and urged his reader to scrutinize with care his 
mathematics, to be vigilant whenever figures were 
introduced, to be on guard, indeed, at every 
phrase if they would finally succeed in 
"untwisting all the chains that tie The hidden 
soul of harmony" in his pattern. Such analysis is 
particularly important in solving the puzzle of 
the complex Flying Island, for magnetism and 
loadstones, Gilbert and Newton, "flying chariots" 
and the world in the moon are here welded into a 
new whole which takes its place as one of the most 
remarkable pseudo-scientific passage in the 
literature of the eighteenth century ("Swift's 
'Flying Island' in the Voyage to Laputaru 406).
Once again Swift presents us with a double-bind. Though 
Swift gave this satire a recognizable scientific background,
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using science to document the existence of a flying island 
establishes its credibility at the same time science 
actually mocks its credulity.
Presenting Gulliver as an impartial observer, then, 
makes him a kind of scientist who endeavors to record the 
facts, or rather, the truth; therefore, A Voyage to Laputa 
appropriately parodies such endeavors, for Swift mocks the 
objective truth Laputian science strives to obtain by 
mocking its modus operandi in the same way that Erasmus uses 
logic to mock logic. If Swift parodies science in A Voyage 
to Laputa, or uses reason to validate the unreasonable, then 
Swift again follows in the Erasmian tradition, where the 
speaker uses logic to substantiate the illogical. Walter 
Kaiser, in his Praisers of Folly— a study focused on three 
praisers of folly, Erasmus, Shakespeare, and Rabelais—  
believes that only Erasmus and Swift successfully use the 
mock encomium:
I know no other mock encomium before the Moriae 
encomium that employs this subtle device [the mock 
encomium— where the mocking is mocked], and after 
Erasmus only Swift successfully approximates it.
Certain modern authors have at times done 
something analogous, and there are common dramatic 
devices that are similar, but, with the exception 
of Swift, no one has employed this particular 
strategy in guite the way Erasmus does (37).
A Voyage to Laputa has an aura of logical discourse and 
objectivity similar to Stultitia's in The Praise of Folly, 
an aura which serves to convince the reader that the
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narrator is trustworthy and no simpleton, and has a 
scientific deportment that can dupe the reader.
A Voyage to Laputa, then, like The Praise of Follv. 
satirizes the reader's intellectual facilities— or rather, 
his decoding efforts— by mocking his methodology. This 
theme is underscored by yet another parallel to The Praise 
of Follv. for Swift's Laputians seem to be exaggerated 
versions of Stultitia's natural philosophers.34 If 
Stultitia's natural philosophers are so "ignorant of 
themselves [that] they cannot avoid falling into a ditch or 
stumbling over a rock in the path" (56), then Gulliver's 
physical description of the Laputians is the literal 
manifestation of such behavior: "[t]heir Heads were all
reclined to the Right, or the Left; one of their Eyes turned 
inward, and the other directly up to the Zenith" (13 2).35 
If the vision of these cross-eyed Laputians is thus 
distorted, and, if sight is a metaphor for knowledge, then 
such abstract thinkers are fools who cannot "see" straight. 
The reader, then, can be compared to the Laputians, for he 
too may become so caught up with intense deciphering, he 
cannot "see" himself reflected in the satire.36
Swift's solution for such absent-mindedness alludes to 
a familiar plaything of the literary fool— his bauble— which 
further mocks the Laputians. The Laputians are "so taken up 
with intense Speculations, that they neither can speak, or 
attend to the Discourses of others, without being rouzed by
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some external Taction upon Organs of Speech and Hearing. .
." (132). This "external Taction" is provided by 
"flappers," Laputian servants who gently strike upon their 
masters' ears and mouth with "a blown Bladder fastned like a 
Flail to the End of a short Stick, which they carried in 
their Hands. . . .  In each Bladder was a small Quantity of 
dried Pease, or little Pebbles" (132). Willeford's The Fool 
and His Scepter discusses characteristics of the fool and 
notes that "attached to the bauble of the European court 
jester was often a bladder formed into a clear 
representation of a phallus" (ll).37 And E.K. Chambers in 
The Mediaeval Stage observes that the marotte in some 
figures is "replaced or supplemented by some other form of 
bauble, such as a bladder on a stick, stuffed into various 
shapes, or hollow and containing peas" (385).38 Swift, 
associating the Laputian flapper/bladder practice with the 
traditional fool's bauble, undermines their lofty 
"speculative" thinking and mocks their mocking.
This repulsive convention even ridicules communication, 
because Swift degrades the Laputians' audio and vocal 
abilities. Gulliver describes this Laputian practice as if 
the "flappers" are urinating on their employers— he "gently 
strike[s] with his Bladder the Mouth of him who is to speak, 
and the Right Ear of him or them to whom the Speaker 
addresseth himself" (133). So, to gain the Laputians' 
attention, they must be hit on the ears and mouth with a
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bladder, an absurd image which contradicts their claim to 
rational thought. This joke becomes more grotesque when 
Gulliver later refers to the flappers' flails as "flaps," 
saying "[t]here stood by him [the King of Laputa] on each 
Side, a young Page, with Flaps in their Hands. . ." (133).
If "flaps" are bladders, then Gulliver makes it sound as if 
the flappers are holding their penises (masturbating?), 
ready to strike the King on his ears and mouth with 
them.39 Again, this ludicrous image makes the Laputians 
appear ridiculous. When Gulliver protests this "practice," 
he later discovers that doing so "gave his Majesty and the 
whole Court a very mean Opinion of my Understanding" (134), 
so the Laputians think less of Gulliver's intelligence 
because he can converse with others without being urinated 
upon or hit with a penis. Such repulsive practices, then,
would convince the reader that, because the Laputians
communicate in such a grotesque manner, Gulliver is more
trustworthy in his assessments.
If we determine that such practices are loathsome, 
Gulliver's choice of companions while in Laputa makes sense. 
Gulliver eventually confesses that he prefers second-class 
citizens as companions to the Laputians, declaring "I 
conversed only with Women, Tradesmen, Flappers, and Court- 
pages, during two Months of my Abode there; by which at 
least I rendered my self extremely contemptible; yet these 
were the only People from whom I could ever receive a
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reasonable Answer” (147). Because these lowly people were 
not concerned with such speculative thinking, they could 
converse without being hit on the ears and mouth with a 
bladder, much to the Laputians' abhorrence.
But decoding a text requires some degree of 
speculation, or rather, reflection, on the reader's part, 
for Swift invites such scrutiny when he holds up his satiric 
glass. Again, we are caught in a double-bind: we are asked
to reflect on this text at the same time we are punished for 
doing so. If we condemn the Laputians for such speculative 
thinking, then we are hypocrites, for we have disassociated 
ourselves from the text, and have become characterized 
readers who cannot see that reading requires speculation.
Our modus operandi is parodied by Swift, for he compels us 
to perform the tasks he ridicules, namely, speculate.
The reader's methodology is further ridiculed by Swift 
when Gulliver visits the Royal Academy of Lagado, an academy 
of scientific projectors. Here, he tries his hand at 
projecting, proposing a way to discover treasonous plots.
He says that in a country "where I had long sojourned," the 
bulk of people were "Discoverers, Witnesses, Informers, 
Accusers, Prosecutors, Evidences, Swearers," and that the 
name of this kingdom is "Tribnia, by the Natives called 
Langden" (163). If the reader unscrambles the anagrams, he 
discovers Tribnia is "Britain" and Langden is "England,"
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indicating that Swift is making a political allusion. 
Gulliver continues with his proposition, remarking that,
It is first agreed and settled among them [the 
natives of Tribnia], what suspected Persons shall 
be accused of a Plot: Then, effectual Care is
taken to secure all their Letters and other 
Papers, and put the Owners in Chains. These 
Papers are delivered to a Set of Artists very 
dextrous in finding out the mysterious Meanings of 
Words, Syllables and Letters. For Instance, they 
can decypher a Close-stool to signify a Privy- 
Council; a Flock of Geese, a Senate; a lame Dog, 
an Invader; the Plague, a standing Army; a Buzard, 
a Minister; the Gout, a High Priest; a Gibbet, a 
Secretary; a Chamber pot, a Committee of Grandees; 
a Sieve, a Court Lady; a Broom, a Revolution; a 
Mouse-trap, an Employment; a bottomless Pit, the 
Treasury; a Sink, a C[our]t; a Cap and Bells, a 
Favourite; a broken Reed, a Court of Justice; an 
empty Tun, a General; a running Sore, the 
Administration (163-164).
While Gulliver is oblivious of his examples' significance, 
the reader is intended to view them as reflective of a real 
event; namely, the fabrication of evidence used against 
Swift's "traitorous" friend Francis Atterbury, Bishop of 
Rochester and Dean of Westminster.40 The charges brought 
against him alleged that he was a leader in a treasonable 
conspiracy, involving invasion, insurrection, and the 
restoration of the Pretender to the throne of England.
Since such political "deciphering" lent itself to elaborate 
mockery, Swift reduces the body of "evidence" the government 
used to a few silly deductions. Yet, when the reader solves 
the anagrams and acrostics, he is compelled to view these 
cryptic messages as political allusions to events in
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England, and Swift ridicules him for decoding the text in 
the same way Swift ridicules those who "deciphered" the 
documents used against Atterbury— readers who use unraveled 
anagrams as answers.
Paradoxically, for the reader to "get the joke," he 
must decode such political decipherings. For example, 
Swift's contemporaries were meant to recognize further 
allusions to Atterbury's situation in Gulliver's examples of 
what such word "Artists" might substitute, i.e., "a lame 
Dog, an Invader; the Plague, a standing Army; a Buzard, a 
Minister; the Gout, a High Priest." Gulliver is alluding to 
three letters that were used against Atterbury, containing 
references to the whereabouts of a known renegade, Jones or 
Illington, on specific dates that coincided with Atterbury's 
movements, Jones/Illington is suffering from gout and his 
wife's having died, and a dog named Harlequin, that had been 
sent as a gift from France to Jones/Illington.41 After 
these letters were produced as "evidence," the counsel 
against Atterbury sarcastically asked, "[i]s there no other 
Person who was in Town on the seventh of May, out of Town on 
the tenth and fourteenth, in Town on the fifteenth, whose 
Wife died the Week before the thirtieth of April, he himself 
ill of the Gout, to whom a Dog was sent from France by the 
name of Harlequin that broke its Leg, and was brought to 
Mrs. Barnes by Mr. Kelly in order to be cured?" (Rosenheim, 
"Swift and the Atterbury Case," 181)42 If Swift felt that
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such trumped up evidence used to condemn Atterbury was an 
affront to reason, then Gulliver's examples mock such 
testimony, because his connections between the initial word 
and his substitution are unintelligible, unless we 
substitute for his substitutions.43 If we do not, we miss 
Swift's joke; if we do, we become the butt of the joke, for 
we perform the very task Swift ridicules— we decipher words 
in a text.
We are again ridiculed when we decode the word "privy." 
In the body of "evidence" used to condemn Atterbury, the 
"close-stool" referred to inconsequential letters discovered 
in the episcopal close-stool (or toilet), from which 
Gulliver's "dexterous Artists" derive "Privy-Council," or a 
group conducting secret transactions.44 If we substitute 
"latrine" for "privy," then a "Privy-Council" sounds like a 
group of men conducting secret and potentially seditious 
meetings in a latrine (defecating?), which ridicules both 
Gulliver's pretentiousness and Atterbury's trial.45 Yet, 
because our substitution is as ludicrous as those used to 
condemn Atterbury, we too become "dexterous Artists," the 
objects of .Swift's attack.
But to understand the text, we must "break" Swift's 
codes; and sometimes, Swift does not punish us for doing so. 
We find such a literary code in the word "utter." One 
Laputian projection that Gulliver observes was for "entirely 
abolishing all Words whatsoever, for words corrode the lungs
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thereby shortening our life span11 (158) ; so, these 
projectors propose to communicate not with words but with 
things carried in a bundle upon a servant*s back, like so 
many peddlers, who, opening their sacks, "hold Conversation 
for an Hour together" (158). The great advantage to this 
scheme, as Gulliver expresses it, is that "it would serve as 
an universal Language to be understood in all civilized 
Nations, whose Goods and Utensils are generally of the same 
Kind, or nearly resembling, so that their Uses might easily 
be comprehended" (159). And thus, Gulliver concludes, 
"Embassadors would be qualified to treat with foreign 
Princes or Ministers of State, to whose Tongues they were 
utter Strangers" (159). As an adjective, "utter" means 
"entire, total"; but, as a verb, "utter" means to speak or 
to pronounce, which is what the science projectors want to 
abolish.46 Swift reverses our expectations when we decode 
this word, for it trivalizes the whole projection by mocking 
its attempt to abolish "uttering."
Other codes exist that we may "break" without fear of 
punishment. For example, Gulliver's description of the 
Laputian experiment concerning a cure for colic might have 
sounded familiar to his contemporaries, for it had also been 
performed at the Royal Society of London. Gulliver, 
"complaining of a small fit of the cholick", observes a 
"great Physician famous for curing that Disease" inserting a 
pair of bellows into the anus of a dog, then discharging air
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into its bowels; when the dog dies, the physician attempted 
to revive it by the same operation [i.e., by artificial 
respiration— I take this to mean he traded the anus for the 
mouth] (154-5). Nicolson and Molher note that this 
experiment, satirized by Shadwell, was described in Spratfs 
History of the Roval Society (ed. cit., 232): "By means of
a Pair of Bellows, and a certain Pipe thrust into the Wind­
pipe of the Creature", artificial respiration was 
established and its effects observed" ("The Scientific 
Background of Swift's Voyage to Laputa," 325).47 Swift, 
however, takes this "scientific observation" to farcical 
exaggeration— here, a Laputian projector blows up dogs. The 
reader can only imagine what would have happened if 
Gulliver, who had complained of a bit of colic, had agreed 
to be "cured" in such a manner. Here, the reader may safely 
decode this metaphor without fear of ridicule.
Other codes exist that may be safely "broken." Again, 
Swift's contemporaries might also recognize the Royal 
Academy of London when he portrays the Laputian projectors 
as beggars. When Gulliver first visits the Royal Academy 
(Chapter V), he undermines the whole academy when he 
describes his first encounter with a projector trying to 
"extract Sun-Beams out of Cucumbers" (152-3). This man, 
immediately after explaining the nature of his experiment, 
begs Gulliver for money: "He complained that his Stock was
low, and intreated me to give him something as an
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Encouragement to Ingenuity, especially since this had been a 
very dear Season for Cucumbers. I made him a small Present, 
for my Lord [Munodi] had furnished me with Money on purpose, 
because he knew their Practice of begging from all who go to 
see them" (153). Certainly Swift trivalizes these pursuits 
by making such noble science projectors nothing but beggars, 
or rather, charlatans, since they beg for money in order to 
support themselves. Thus, "breaking" these codes does not 
victimize us— rather, successfully recognizing the Royal 
Academy of London in Gulliver's Royal Academy of Lagado 
encourages us to find more codes.
Yet, such success lures us into feeling self-satisfied, 
for these triumphs of reading also encourage our 
intellectual vanity. Our faith in our abilities to 
comprehend the text, then, may persuade us to misapply it; 
and, if we see those foolish mistakes reflected in Swift's 
satiric glass, may lead us to a greater understanding of the 
text.
Simply deciphering the text, then, forces us to perform 
the very tasks Swift condemns— and though we are sometimes 
correct in doing so, we must acknowledge our foolish 
behavior or risk being hypocrites. We can only "break" 
Swift's literary codes at the cost of our intellectual 
vanity, for it is the "breaking" that Swift parodies. When 
we choose to substitute a word or expression, when we 
unscramble anagrams, when we discover who "speaks as a
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fool," then, determines whether we are fools. Lured by 
flattery, seduced by partial success, attracted to an 
appealing narrator, when we decipher A Voyage to Laputa, 
Swift challenges not our intellectual capabilities, but our 
ability to see our intellectual limitations.
Notes
1. Swift*s "Preface of the Author," in The Battle of the 
Books, 1710.
2. I take glass to mean mirror. From the O.E.D.: Glass:
II. 8a: A glass mirror, a looking glass: 1712 Addison Spec.
No. 311 "A fop who admires his Person in a Glass." 8b: 
Applied to a mirror of other material: 1576 Gascoigne
(title) The Steele Glas. 8c: Applied to water as a mirror:
1716 Addison Salmacis & Herm 3 7 "In the limpid streams she 
views her face, And drest her image in the floating glass." 
IV.4a: To set (an object, oneself) before a mirror or other
reflecting surface, so as to cause an image to be reflected, 
also to view the reflection of, see as in a mirror: 1566
Sidney Arcadia III 358 "He had lifted up his face to glasse 
himselfe in the fair eyes." 4b: Of a mirror or reflecting
surface: 1628 Greville Brooke Coelica Poems (1633) 220 "Let
my present thoughts be glassed in the thoughts which you 
have passed."
3. Wolfgang Iser's The Implied Reader states that this 
relationship between the author and the reader was 
cultivated during the eighteenth century (see 31 and 102).
He quotes a letter of Richardson's: "[T]he story must leave
something for the reader to do" (Selected Letters. 296) ; and 
the narrator1s address to the reader in Fielding's Tom 
Jones: "Bestir thyself therefore on this occasion; for,
though we will always lend thee proper assistance in 
difficult places, as we do not, like some others, expect 
thee to use the arts of divination to discover our meaning, 
yet we shall not indulge thy laziness where nothing but thy 
own attention is required; this great work, to leave thy 
sagacity nothing to do; or that, without sometimes 
exercising this talent, thou wilt be able to travel through 
our pages with any pleasure or profit to thyself" (XI.9:95).
4. Also known as a "double-entendre," or "doublespeak." 
From A Dictionary of Literary Terms: "double entente, un 
mot a a French term signifying an ambiguity (q.v.). A word 
or expression so used that it can have two meanings; one of 
which is usually frivolous or bawdy . . . .  It is commoner 
now to use the phrase double entendre" (202).
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5. By "schematised views" Iser is referring to the 
different ways of perceiving the characters and events in 
the text, which are offered by the text itself.
6. Iser defines this method: "The phenomenological theory 
of art lays full stress on the idea that, in considering a 
literary work, one must take into account not only the 
actual text but also, and in equal measure, the actions 
involved in responding to that text" (The Implied Reader. 
274) .
7. I believe that Korshin missed the point when he states 
that the reader need not take all of Swift*s code names 
seriously, because Swift parodies secret writing. How does 
the reader know which codes are serious and which are 
superficial? Korshin does not tell us.
8. In a hilarious letter to Swift, after Gulliver1s 
Travels was first published, John Gay sarcastically advises 
him, "[b]ut it will be much better to come over your self, 
and read it here [in London], where you will have the 
pleasure of variety of commentators, to explain the 
difficult passages to you" (The Correspondences of Jonathan 
Swift. 176).
9. Some of the following characteristics of the two 
readers comes from Smith*s article previously cited, and in 
particular, the characterized reader described in Ewald*s 
The Masks of Jonathan Swift (124-62).
10. "eao7TTpov, ou, t o : Mirror." The same Greek word for
mirror/glass is also used in James 1:23-4, where James talks 
about a man who sees himself in a glass and then forgets who 
he is, "[f]or if any be a hearer of the word, and not a 
doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a 
glass: for he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and
straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was" (A Greek- 
Enolish Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, 84). Another commentary paraphrases 
the Corinthian passage thus: "[n]ow we try to guess at
truth as we see its blurred and distorted outlines in the 
mirror of burnished metal: (The Abingdon Bible Commentary. 
1188).
11. Please note that the Greek word Paul uses to express 
the quality of knowledge we will have means "to know 
exactly, completely;*' or, in Greek, "ctti yi vwanw" (also note 
that Paul is using the future tense; A Greek-Enqlish Lexicon 
of the New Testament. 78).
12. See Num. 12:8 in relation to I Cor. 13:12's reference 
to "face to face" communication— "With him [Moses] will I
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[God] speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark 
speeches; and the similitude of the LORD shall he behold . .
(116; emphasis mine). Here, God is addressing Aaron and 
Miriam, both of whom spoke out against Moses. The Anchor 
Bible comments on the relationship between "mouth to mouth" 
and "face to face": "[t]he phrase is probably not to be
taken in a general sense but is to be referred to direct 
knowledge of God. The reference to Num. 12:8 suggests Moses 
as the paradigm: there the expression is 'mouth to mouth';
but it is clear that immediate confrontation is intended 
(cf. Exod. 33:11; Deut. 34:10). The same idea occurs 
elsewhere (e.g., Gen. 32:10; but since Paul has been writing 
about prophecy, Moses as the key prophet provides the 
appropriate referent). Moses1 'face to face* communication 
with God marks his unique prophetic role" (292). I believe 
that the similarity between the two expressions "face to 
face" and "mouth to mouth" emphasizes the idea that ultimate 
communication occurs at a one-to-one correspondence, where 
the division between appearance and reality is eradicated. 
Linguistically, this is where the signifier actually 
signifies the signified.
13. Creon first describes to Oedipus that the oracle is 
ambiguous: "the Oracle, most noble King, is dark and hidden
lies" (1.9). And then, Creon tells Oedipus what is said: 
"Apollo then, most noble King, himself commandeth thus: 'By
exile purge the prince's seat, and plague with vengeance 
due/That hapless wretch whose bloody hands of late King 
Laius slew./Before that this performed be, no hope of milder 
air./Wherefore do this, 0 King, or else all hope of help 
despair"' (Oedipus, II.1.14-15). This oracle provided an 
obscure answer (an oxymoron), a response which needed to be 
interpreted because it is puzzling.
14. From The Westminister Dictionary of Christian Theology: 
"The dominant influence on the treatment of revelation in 
Christian theology, however, is the distinction between 
natural and revealed theology. Although there are earlier 
suggestions of this distinction, it was brought into 
prominence by Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274). Basically it 
distinguishes between those truths about God which can be 
determined by unaided human reasoning and other truths which 
cannot be apprehended, or cannot be apprehended without 
doubt and the risk of distortion [a common characteristic of 
satire], unless they are disclosed by God. The former 
[natural theology], are usually held to contain such truths 
as that God exists and that he is eternal, while the latter 
[revealed theology] include such matters as God's triune
nature and the manner of his redemptive activity. According 
the prevalent view in Christian theology, it is only when 
the former are augmented by the latter that humanity has the 
saving knowledge of God which it seeks" (504).
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15. Swift and his friends refer to Gu11iver1s Trave1s 
before its first publication: Viscount Bolingbroke to 
Swift, 24 July 1725, "[T]hus much I thought I might say 
about my private affairs to an old friend without diverting 
him too long from his labours to promote the advantage of 
the church and state of Ireland, or from his travels into 
those Countrys of Giants and Pigmeys from whence he imports 
a cargo I value at an higher rate than that of the richest 
Galeon" (The Correspondences of Jonathan Swift. III. 82) ; 
Swift to Charles Ford, 14 August 1725, "I have finished my 
TravelIs, and I am now transcribing them; they are admirable 
Things, and will wonderfully mend the World" (The 
Correspondences of Jonathan Swift. III. 87); Alexander Pope 
to Swift, 14 September 1725, "Your Travels I hear much of; 
my own I promise you shall never more be in a strange land, 
but a diligent, I hope useful investigation of my own 
Territories [Pope's earliest reference to his "Essay on 
Man"]" (The Correspondences of Jonathan Swift. III. 96); 
Swift to Sheridan, 11 September 1725, "[E]xpect no more from 
Man than such an Animale is capable of, and you will every 
day find my Description of Yahoes more resembling" (The 
Correspondences of Jonathan Swift. III. 93-4).
16. From I Corinthians: "We are fools for Christ's sake,
but ye are wise in Christ" (4:10); and "Let no man deceive 
himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this 
world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. For the 
wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (3:18-19). 
Walter Kaiser nicely sums up this "wise folly" motif: "The
Pauline concept of the Fool in Christ, which is given its 
fullest exposition in the Epistles to the Corinthians, 
affirms the worthlessness of worldly wisdom in contrast to 
the wisdom of the Christian, which to the world appears 
folly" (Dictionary of the History of Ideas. IV., 517). 
Ehrenpreis concludes that "[o]n the level of morality 
Gulliver echoes the claim of St. Paul in Swift's favorite 
epistle, 'But I keep under my body, and bring it into 
subjection' (I Corinthians, 9:27; Ehrenpreis, III, 427).
17. That Swift esteemed Erasmus as a true "ancient scholar" 
is mentioned in Ehrenpreis' discussion of Swift's The Battle 
of the Books (1.226-37). Also, Swift freely makes reference 
to him in his letters, writing on one occasion that "The 
Christian religion, in the most early times, was proposed to 
the Jews and Heathens, without the article of Christ's 
divinity; which I remember, Erasmus accounts for by its 
being too strong a meat for babes" (Davis, IX. 2 62). Most 
notably, in the early months of 1714, Swift was part of a 
club consisting of Oxford, Arbuthnot, Gay and Pope— a.k.a. 
"the five wits." The club's aim was "a collaborative 
periodical [about] the life and works of an imaginary pedant 
to be named Martin Scriblerus [who] was to be a dabbler in 
all sciences and master of none. Like Panurge in Rabelais's
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Third Book, he was to search for truth through every field 
of systematic knowledge but never meet it. The club was to 
produce pseudo-treatises supposed to be by Scriblerus, and 
to attribute to him the real work of real men. Like 
Stultitia of Erasmus, he was to take credit for all abuses 
of learning" (Ehrenpreis, II. 725). About the literary 
impact of such a character Ehrenpreis later says, "[w]hether 
he [Swift] was recalling Jack in A Tale of a Tub or 
germinating Captain Gulliver, he had similar ingredients in 
his finest work" (II. 726) .
18. Stultitia paraphrases Paul: "All these witnesses point
to a single conclusion, that all men are fools, even the 
pious ones. Christ himself, though he was the wisdom of the 
Father, took on the foolishness of humanity in order to 
relieve the folly of mortals, just as he became sin in order 
to redeem sinners" (81).
19. Sir Thomas More (c. 1500) actually employed a mentally 
retarded man who had suffered brain damage as the result of 
a fall from a church steeple as his household fool 
(incidently, Erasmus wrote the Moria encomium in More's 
house, the title of which is a pun on Sir Thomas' name).
20. Such a mouthpiece is know as a personae, a mask that 
the author assumes to distance himself from the attack, thus 
protecting his own integrity. Alvin Kernan's The Cankered 
Muse asserts, "[t]he gap between author and satirist 
implicit in the elaboration of fictitious personae in formal 
verse satire grows wider in those narrative and dramatic 
works where the author disappears and the satirist becomes a 
character in his own right, responsible for the attack and 
for any unpleasantness that may be associated with it"
(213). Gulliver's Travels is sometimes this kind of 
narrative— Gulliver occasionally emerges as a world weary 
adventurer whose bitter and scathing comments on man's 
degenerate nature are made without appearing to indict 
Swift. Just as often, Gulliver is the object of his attack, 
and when this occurs, Gulliver is not Swift's personae.
21. Rosenheim's Swift and the Satirist's Art gives a 
detailed analysis of the satirist's "truth": "Quasi-slander
is redeemed from being outright slander to the extent that 
demonstrable fact serves as a minimal basis for the 
satirist's fabrications and distortions. In this sense— and 
only I believe, in this sense— is the truth under all 
circumstances indispensable to the satirist. It is 
essential to the satiric art that truth be exploited; it is 
not essential that truth be novelly disclosed, reaffirmed, 
augmented, or glorified. In many successful satires—  
particularly of the kind I have called 'punitive'— the only 
'truth' which must necessarily be apprehended is entirely 
simple: the identification of a fictional protagonist with
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an authentic individual, the grasp on manifest actuality 
which enables us to sense an equally manifest distortion, 
the recognition of correspondences between the satiric 
invention and what are often the most commonplace matters of 
fact" (180).
22. Ehrenpreis says this of Swift1s occasional mask, 
Gulliver: "But rather than speak out directly, he would
speak both ironically and simply in turns, through the 
mouths of various spokesmen, including an eponymous 
narrator. By employing fictitious persons and places in a 
pseudo-memoir, he would escape the frustrations that had 
smothered his less covert speech. Thus self-transforming 
energy of the unprintable essays found a new vehicle, bold 
enough to satisfy Swift's anger, expressive enough to convey 
his doctrine, but so disguised that it could be sold in 
London" (III. 446).
23. About physical size and deformity, Willeford notes that 
"in many times and places dwarfs and hunchbacks have served 
as jesters, the dwarf being defective in physical size in a 
way that corresponds to the idiot's insufficiency of 
intelligence, the hunchback being deformed in a way that 
corresponds to the psychic aberration of the madman . . . .  
The use of such physical freaks as jesters is surely in part 
the expression of an ambivalence that also results in the 
relegation of such people to the margins of human society: 
grotesques have both positive and negative powers; they are 
hideously attractive; they should be approached and avoided, 
abused and placated" (The Fool and His Scepter. 14-5).
24. The term "grotesque" is one of those slippery literary 
catagories that can be applied to any distortion of nature, 
of meaning, of architecture. A Dictionary of Literary Terms 
gives an excellent definition of where the term "grotesque" 
came from and how it is employed in literature (298-9).
25. One twentieth century critic, W.S. Eddy, blames this 
banal account on Swift's literary quirks: "There seems to
be no motive for the story beyond a pointless and not too 
artfully contrived satire on mathematicians . . . .  For 
this attack on theoretical science I can find no literary 
source or analogue, and conclude that it must have been 
inspired by one of Swift's literary idiosyncracies.
Attempts have been made to detect allusions to the work of 
Newton and other contemporary scientists, but these, however 
successful, cannot greatly increase for us the slight 
importance of the satire on Laputa" (158). Even Ehrenpreis 
asserts that although Gulliver's Travels is built on the 
body/soul dichotomy, because A Voyage to Laputa avoids such 
a distinction, it is comparatively second-rate: "On the one
hand, the body is the spirit's tragedy; on the other, it is 
the spirit's farce. Gulliver's Travels is designed to keep
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both these attitudes in sight at once, and to destroy the 
dignity of man in all his shapes by their constant 
juxtaposition. This is why Swift delights in the quarrel 
between physical needs and human ambition, between the 
tangible world and the ways of men. It is why he builds his 
work on the physical contrasts of size and shape, why he 
draws attention to Gulliver's bowels and bladder, to his 
genitals, to the freckles of Lilliputian ladies, to the 
breast of the giant wet nurse, the stinks of the maids of 
honor, the cancer of the giant beggar-woman. It is one 
reason that Part Three, which is not based on such 
contrasts, is the weakest section of the book" (III. 464).
26. Why A Voyage to Laputa deviates from the other three 
voyages structurally and thematically is partially explained 
by the composition of Gulliver's Travels itself. If Swift's 
correspondence is taken literally, then A Voyage to Laputa 
was the last of the four to be written, and the voyages to 
Lilliput, Brobdingnag, and Houyhnhnms are all of a piece; 
thus, A Voyage to Laputa is more likely to be a separate 
literary venture. Swift says to Ford, 19 January 1724: "I
have left the Country of Horses, and am in the flying 
Island, where I shall not stay long, and my two last 
Journyes will be soon over. . ." (5). Ehrenpreis devotes a 
section to the composition of A Voyage to Laputa in his 
biography of Swift, where he carefully outlines 
collaborating evidence of its being the last one written, 
citing both Swift's correspondence and Gulliver's Travels' 
allusions to current political events. Williams claims this 
proves that Part Four was written by 1723 and that A Voyage 
to Laputa was mostly written in 1724 (The Correspondences of 
Jonathan Swift. III. 5). These observations, however, 
conflicts with the arrangement of the four books, for A 
Voyage to Laputa is the third voyage in Gulliver's Travels. 
This can be explained in two ways: 1) Swift might have
wanted to bury A Voyage to Laputa between voyages because it 
contained the most contemporary political allusions, and 
therefore, was the most dangerous of the four voyages; and,
2) Swift's first publisher, Motte, might himself have 
recognized the danger and rearranged them.
27. Swift writes to Pope, 29 September 1725, where he 
playfully upends a stock Latin maxim: "I have got Materials
Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of the Definition 
animale rationale; and to show it should be only rationis 
capax. Upon this great foundation of Misanthropy (though 
not Timons manner) The whole building of my Travells is 
erected: And I never will have peace of mind till all
honest men are of my Opinion . . . (The Correspondences of 
Jonathan Swift. Ill). From the Oxford Latin Dictionary; 
Animale: 1. "A member of the animal kingdom, a living
creature, animal" (133). Capax: 4. "Capable of
apprehending, understanding" (268). Rationalis:
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"Possessing reason, rational" (1577). I take Swift to mean 
that man is not innately rational, but only capable of 
behaving rationally, which implies that man is just as 
capable of behaving irrationally. Ehrenpreis has an 
interesting discussion on Swift's penchant for inverting 
stock Latin expressions: "For it was in the Instltutiones
logicae written by the provost [Marsh] 'in usum iuvbentutis 
academicae Dubliniensis' that he [Swift] studied those 
commonplace examples and ancient truisms which he was to 
manipulate in his most brilliant satires: homo est animal
rationale; nullus equus est rational; si simia non sit 
irrationalis est homo; solum animal rationale est 
disciplinae capax; and those apostolic names, 'Johannes, 
Petrus, Thomas' used as examples of individual men" (1.49- 
50) .
28. This satire, which Ricardo Quintana aptly calls 
"situational satire," is also known as Menippean— "after 
Menippus, its originator, who was a philosopher and a cynic 
of the third century B.C., who satirized the follies of men, 
including philosophers, in a mixture of prose and verse; or 
Varronian, after Varro, Menippus' imitator" ("Situational 
Satire: A Commentary on the Method of Swift," 91-9). Alvin 
Kernan defines Menippean satire in his The Cankered Muse: 
"the term 'Menippean' originally referred to those satires 
which were written in a mixture of verse and prose, but it 
has gradually come to include any satiric work obviously 
written in the third person, to put it another way, where 
the attack is managed under cover of a fable. Dryden— who 
prefers the alternate term Varronian— cites as examples . .
. The Praise of Folly" (13).
29. Quintana notes, "[i]t is to be observed that the 
satirist [Gulliver] is himself not involved: he is as much 
an observer, as much outside all the fuss and nonsense, as 
we are" (95).
30. The Abbe did more than drop passages he thought 
inappropriate to France in his French translation of 
Gulliver's Travels. In his first edition (around the end of 
April 1727), the Abbe devoted a section of his preface to 
the crudeness and indecency in the original book, and then 
brutally cut and rewrote the narratives to suit the French. 
Swift's letter to the Abbe, as I quote, reads in the French, 
"Les Partisans de ce Gulliver, qui ne laissent pas d'etre en 
fort grand nombre chez nous, soutiennent, que son Livre 
durera autant que noter language, parce qu'il ne tire pas 
son merite de certaines modes our manieres de penser et de 
partler, mais d'une sutie d'observations sur les 
imperfections, les folies, et les vices de l'homme . . . .  
Vous serez sans doute surpris de scavoir qu'ils regardent ce 
chirurgien de vaisseau come un Auteur grave, qui ne sort 
jamais de son serieux, qui n'emprunte aucun fard, que ne se
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que point d 1avoir de 1*esprit, et que se contente de 
communiquer au publikc, dans une Narration simple et naive, 
les avantures qui luy sont arrivees, et les choses qu'il a 
vu ou entrendu dire pedant ses voyages'* (The Correspondences 
of Jonathan Swift. III. 226).
31. These maps and drawings were not done by Swift, but by 
Herman Moll, an eighteenth century cartographer; nor were 
the prints of scenes from Gulliver's adventures that 
appeared more than a year after the first publication 
(Ehrenpreis, III. 498). Swift, though, did offer 
suggestions: "He [Gulliver] would appear best, wedged in 
the marrow bone up to the middle, or in the monkey's arms 
upon the roof, or left upon the ridge and the footman on the 
ladder going to relieve him of fighting with the rats on the 
farmer's bed, or in the spaniel's mouth, which being 
described as a small dog, he might look as large as a duck 
in ours; one of the best would I think be to see his chest 
just falling into the sea while three eagles are quarrelling 
with one another. Or the monkey hauling him out of his box" 
(Williams, III. 257).
32. The first article claims, "[t]he attempt of this study 
will be to show that Swift borrowed for A Voyage to Laputa 
even more than for the other tales, but that the sources of 
his borrowings were different. The mathematicians who 
feared the sun and comet, the projectors of the Grand 
Academy, the Flying Island— these came to Swift almost 
entirely from contemporary science. The sources for nearly 
all the theories of the Laputians and the Balnibarians are 
to be found in the work of Swift's contemporary scientists 
and particularly in the Philosophical Transactions of the 
Roval Society" ("The Scientific Background of Swift's Voyage 
to Laputa," 415).
33. Nicolson and Mohler conclude, "for there seems little 
doubt that Swift intended his generation to recognize in his 
Floating Island and in its curious relation to Balnibari the 
symbolism of 'Mr. Gilbert's Notion' (of the Earths whole 
body being but one great Magnet; and lesser Magnets being so 
many Terrella's sympathizing with the whole)" ("The Flying 
Island in the Voyage to Laputa," 415).
34. From The Praise of Follv: "Come next the natural
philosophers, long of beard and furry of gown, who declare 
that they alone possess wisdom, the rest of mankind being 
incapable of nothing more that fleeting impressions. How 
agreeably they hallucinate when they construct innumerable 
worlds, measuring sun, moon, stars, and heavenly orbits as 
if with thumb and tape-rule. Never at a loss to explain 
thunder, wind, eclipses, and other incomprehensible events, 
and never even hesitating over their explanations, they act 
as if they were in on all the secrets of nature who created
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the universe, as if they came down to us bearing the word 
direct from on high [revelation]. Yet all the time nature 
derides both them and their conjectures. For that nothing 
is settled among them is perfectly evident from the fact 
that they are always fighting with one another over 
inexplicable phenomena. Though they know nothing specific, 
they lay claim to know everything in general. Not only are 
they ignorant of themselves, they cannot avoid falling into 
a ditch or stumbling over a rock in the path (perhaps they 
are blear-eyed from study or just absent-minded); yet they 
claim to know all about abstract ideas, universals, separate 
forms, primary matter, quiddities, and different modes of 
being— objects so phantasmal I doubt if Lynceus himself 
could make them out. They particularly set themselves above 
the profane mob when they bring forth their triangles, 
circles, and such-like mathematical shapes, scribbling one 
atop the other to make a labyrinth and then sprinkling 
letters over them as if in battle-formations designed to 
submerge the plain man in waves of confusion. Some of this 
breed venture to make predictions by consulting the stars; 
they promise more that magical miracles, and sometimes, when 
they are extra lucky, find people to believe them" (56-7).
35. As Ehrenpreis says of Swift1s trick of turning the 
intangible into the tangible, "Illusion and truth, 
appearance and reality, vapour and solid, light and 
darkness, hero and crowd, upward flight and sudden fall, 
these are applied just where they do not belong. The vapour 
which means spirit becomes the vapour which means 
flatulence; the light which illuminates becomes the 
phosphorescence of rotting wood in the dark. The intangible 
is treated as tangible. This is Hobbes* skeptical method of 
reducing ideals to delusions; and Swift, whose flavour is 
remarkably close to Hobbes*, may have learned it from him. 
However, as Empson says, 'the language plays into [Swift*s] 
hands' because 'the spiritual words are all derived from 
physical metaphors'" (198). [Footnote— Some Varieties of 
Pastoral, 1935, 60.]. . . . Swift's warning is not to
confuse the intangible with the good, or the anus with evil" 
(III. 199).
36. Ehrenpreis observes that Swift was a lover of moral 
wisdom, not abstract science: "In literature and learning,
one division was philosophical. Here, Swift assumed the 
central position belonging to the accepted moralists, from 
Plutarch to Montaigne, who warned men against the frailty of 
their nature and praised the stern but humble pursuit of 
duty . . . .  To this plain sort of moral 'philosophy' was 
opposed either the old scholasticism or the new systems of 
Descartes and Hobbes; and in a lunatic fringe were to be 
found a procession of quack sciences (alchemy, astrology), 
hopeless researches (the longitude, squaring the circle, the 
philosopher's stone, occult studies, numerology, the
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cabbala, rosicrucianism, the work of Paracelsus). Both 
scholastic metaphysics and the modern (but outmoded) systems 
of Hobbes and Descartes appeared, to Swift, useless 
speculations beside the irrefutable validity of moral 
wisdom. The ethics of Plato (i.e., the early dialogues), 
Epicurus, and Zeno deserved respect in so far as they 
anticipated Christian doctrine; but neo-platonism, extreme 
stoicism, epicurean physics, all belonged to another 
department and had more significance as illustrating folly 
than as teaching virtue. Scholasticism of course possessed 
few defenders by this date. Long before Bacon, it had been 
the fashionable butt of humanist sneers. But the 
geometrical 'method' of Descartes and the parallel, 
mechanistic scheme of Hobbes (whose critique of 
scholasticism Swift accepted) had admirers. Nevertheless, 
their reduction of the world and of mankind to soulless 
machines, their loud boasts of great accomplishments by easy 
devices, their dismissal of earlier philosophy as futile, 
their promising panaceas while supplying little to help 
man's condition— such appearances made it necessary for 
Swift to reject their work. As for the virtuosi and amateur 
experimenters— the Royal Society and the Dublin 
Philosophical Society— not only did they fall into the same 
class; but if Swift had any knowledge of his university 
teachers' extracurricular studies, the very pedants who 
expounded Aristotle's physics and logic must have seemed the 
first convert to the new (though now fading) obsession"
(III. 193).
37. Willeford also observes: "[t]hus one lexicographer, 
Ernest Weekley, carries further the derivation of 'fool' 
from the Latin follis, which he defines as 'bellows, 
windbag, but probably here in the specific sense of scrotum; 
cf. Ig. coglione, 'a noddie, a foole, a patch, a dolt, a 
peacock' (Florio), lit. testicle; also L. gerro, fool, from 
a Sicilian name for pudendum.' One could also compare the 
obscene oath 'ballocks!' or 'balls!'— testicles— meaning 
'nonsense!' or 'silly pretension!' Weekley's derivation is 
in keeping with the exaggerated sexuality of many clowns and 
fools throughout history and with a commonly accepted idea 
of the origin of the European clown; as Thelma Nikkaus 
summarized the notion, 'It seems probable that all mimes, 
clowns, drolls, and mummers known to Europe were engendered 
by the Satyr of Greek Old Comedy, a form of entertainment 
derived from the phallic ritual and ceremonies of Dionysos' 
(11) .
38. Habit des fous (or fool's costume) is described as 
"parti-coloured garments, the hood with its ears, bells and 
coxcomb, and the marotte (or kind of doll carried by the 
fool which is a replica of his own head and shoulders with 
his hood upon the end of a short staff) . . ." (E.K.
Chambers' Chapter XVI "Guild Fools and Court Fools" gives an
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excellent discussion of these characteristics in his The 
Mediaeval Stage). Please note that Rabelais makes his 
famous Panurge present Triboullet, the fool of Louis XII, 
with a sword of gilt wood and a bladder. See Kaiser's 
Chapter 13, "Bridoye and Triboullet" for a good discussion 
of the docta ignorantia, or the foolishness of worldly 
wisdom and the wisdom of folly in Praisers of Follv. 163- 
178.
39. This masturbation joke is an echo of an earlier, less 
subtle one made in the first few paragraphs of Gulliver's 
Travels, when Gulliver is narrating his background. He says 
that he was apprenticed to a "Mr. James Bates"; recommended 
by "my good Master Mr. Bates"; encouraged by "Mr Bates, my 
Master"; and finally, mentions the death of "my good Master 
Bates" (A Voyage to Lilliput, 3-4).
40. In spite of protestations to the contrary, Atterbury 
was guilty. However, the evidence the government collected 
to use against him was fabricated. See The Tory Crisis in 
Church and State. 1688-173 0: The Career of Francis 
Atterburv. Bishop of Rochester, in particular Chapter 
Twelve, "The Atterbury Plot, 1720-22."
41. Regarding other manufactured evidence, Rosenheim 
states, "It is probable that Atterbury1s opponents 
recognized the weakness of this kind of evidence, and it is 
thus not surprising that their chief arguments centered upon 
a third collections of documents. These were the letters 
that involved, among other things, the celebrated "lame 
dog", and though somewhat complicated and highly 
circumstantial, they were far more damaging that the 
depositions of the informers or the non-committal notes 
found in the close-stool"(180). The link to Atterbury in 
the last example was supplied by a hopelessly confused Mrs. 
Barnes, a former landlady of George Kelly, another 
conspirator, who claimed that a dog, injured on the trip 
from France, "had been left to her to be cured by Mr Kelly" 
and was told by Mr. Kelly that "the said dog was for the 
Bishop of Rochester" ("Swift and the Atterbury Case,11 180).
42. Such highly questionable methods used to convict 
Atterbury are further detailed by Rosenheim: "Damning as
such a question appears, it had been concocted from little 
more than hearsay evidence and some highly irregular 
procedures. The three letters attributed to the Bishop were 
copies— the originals having been intercepted at the post 
office, but eventually sent on to their addresses (obviously 
to elicit the forthcoming damaging replies). The letters 
were alleged to be in Kelly's hand by clerks who had seen, 
but not retained, specimens of Kelly's writing months 
earlier. More astonishingly, the experts, on whose skill at 
deciphering the Lords relied almost entirely for the
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substance of the letters, refused to answer questions 
concerning their methods, because this might "tend to 
discover the art or mystery of deciphering"— a refusal 
cheerfully sustained by the House. As for the 
circumstantial details of the letters themselves, they 
acquired their overwhelming particularity only if the 
Harlequin story could be believed— and to support its truth 
there was only one bewildered woman's account of something 
she had been told by one man" (182). To add to the 
catalogue of offenses against such proceedings, Atterbury 
was never on trial. Rather, on May 16, 172 3, the House of 
Lords passed a Bill to "inflict pains and penalties" upon 
Francis Atterbury, which took effect on June 18, 1723, when 
the late Bishop, deprived of "any office, dignity, 
promotion, benefice, or employment in England", sixty-plus 
years of age and in poor health, left his native country for 
exile on the Continent, and died nine years later 
(Rosenheim, "Swift and the Atterbury Case", 174). An 
account of the proceedings is found in A Complete Collection 
of State Trails and Proceeding for High Treason and Other 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.... ed. T.B. Howell (London, 1809- 
26), XVI. 323-695.
43. Rosenheim concludes: "Beyond the fact that the enemies 
of Atterbury were likewise those of Swift, there were 
aspects of the affair that, whatever the personalities or 
politics involved, were calculated to arouse the Dean's 
indignation. These included the solemn reliance upon the 
deposition of shoddy informers, the highly circumstantial 
evidence, the Lords' complacent acceptance of the experts' 
arcane decipherings, and not least, the professions of 
piety, patriotism, and benevolence which accompanied every 
stage of the attack. Despite the debate that continues to 
rage around Swift's 'ultimate' beliefs, it seems safe to say 
that the proceedings against Atterbury must have offended 
him quite as much upon moral as upon political grounds" 
("Swift and the Atterbury Case," 190).
44. From the O.E.D.: Privy-Council: 2. The private
counsellors of the sovereign; spec, in Great Britain a body 
of advisers selected by the sovereign together with certain 
persons who are member by usage, as the princes of the 
blood, the archbishops and the chief officers of the present 
and past ministers of state. 1667 Duchess of Newcastle Life 
Dk. N. (1886) 9 "King Charles the first made him withal a 
member of the Lord's of his Majestys most honorable Privy 
C o u n c i l b.: Applied (by English writers) to a council of
state in a foreign country, or to the council of an ancient 
King or ruler. 1650 Nicholas Papers (Camden) I. 184 
"These foure are noble men and all of his [Russian] Ma(ties) 
Privy Councell." Atterbury was accused of plotting against 
the British government with Jacobites, a group of men
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(mainly in foreign parts, particularly France) who wanted to 
depose the present King in favor of the Stuarts.
45. From the 0.E.D.: II.3. A private place of ease, a
latrine, a necessary: 1704 Swift Mech. Operat. Spirit § 2
Misc. (1711) 3 03 "As if a Traveller should go about to 
describe a Palace, when he had seen nothing but the Privy."
46. From the O.E.D.: Utter: adjective, II.4a: Going to
the utmost point; extreme, absolute, complete, entire, 
total: 1718 Prior Poems Dedication, "Two things which were
his utter aversion." Verb, II.6a: To give utterance to
(words, speech, a sentence, etc.); to speak, say or 
pronounce: Addison Spect No. 1 f 3 "I scarce uttered the
Quantity of an hundred words." 6b: To give expression to
(a subject, theme, one's thought, etc.); to express, 
describe or report in words; to speak of or about: 1710
Steele Tatler No. 2 f 3 "I must not Prostitute the Liberal 
Sciences so far, as not to utter the Truth in cases which 
[etc.]"
47. Mr. St. Andre in the Philosophical Transactions (1717, 
30, 580; vol.v,i, 270-2) suggests this method as a cure for 
colic: "The Peristaltick Motion of the Intestines is by all
Anatomists supposed to be the proper Motion of those 
Cylindrical Tubes. The use of this Motion is to propel the 
Chyle into the Vasa lactea, and to accelerate the grosser 
parts of the Aliment downwards, in order to expel them, when 
all their nutritive Contents are extracted. This Motion, 
thus established, it naturally seems to follow, that an 
Inversion of it (call'd for that Reason an Antiperistaltick 
Motion) should force the Aliments, Bile, Pancreatic Juice, 
and lastly the Faeces, to ascend towards the Mouth"
(Nicolson and Molher, "The Scientific Background of Swift's 
Voyage to Laputa," 325).
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